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TOM DELAY: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALIST? 
NEAL DEVINS* 
In the spring of 2005, Congress expressed its disapproval of state 
court decision-making in the Terri Schiavo case. Rejecting state court find-
ings that Terri Schiavo (then in a persistent vegetative state) would rather 
die than be kept alive artificially, Congress asked the federal courts to de-
termine whether the removal of a feeding tube violated Ms. Schiavo's con-
stitutional rights.! In defending their intervention into the Schiavo case, 
lawmakers-especially the GOP leadership:---embraced the culture of life 
and, with it, their belief that the Florida courts had wrongly denied Terri 
Schiavo her constitutional rights. More than that, lawmakers argued that 
they were putting into effect the will of the American people. Most notably, 
then-House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) spoke of Ms. Schiavo's 
constitutional rights and said that "[t]he American people are not interested 
in squabbles between Republicans and Democrats, or between the House 
and Senate. They care, and we care, about saving Terri Schiavo's life."2 
DeLay's comments sound a lot like the popular constitutionalism em-
braced by Larry Kramer) For Kramer, the people-acting through their 
elected representatives-should put into place their vision of the Constitu-
tion.4 Judicial decisions inconsistent with the people's will should be re-
* Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. 
Thanks to Rhys James for A+ research help, Dan Hamilton for inviting me to participate in the sympo-
sium, and Luke Shannon and the Chicago-Kent Law Review for their support. 
1. Act of Mar. 21, 2005, Pub L. No. I 09-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
2. Representative Tom DeLay, Majority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, Terri Schiavo Is 
Alive-This Fight Is Not Over; House Continues to Work to Save Terri Schiavo (Mar. 18, 2005). 
3. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
4. !d. at 249. Kramer does not consider the interplay between Congress and the president in 
advancing potentially conflicting visions of the Constitution. As I have argued elsewhere, the president 
has comparative advantages over Congress in advancing his constitutional agenda, and so the presi-
dent's view of the Constitution is likely to dwarf that of Congress. See Neal Devins, Commentary, 
Reanimator: Mark Tushnet and the Second Coming of the Imperial Presidency, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 
359 (2000) (arguing that the president, not Congress, would define the Constitution's meaning in a 
world without judicial review). Presidential dominion over Congress on constitutional questions (even 
by a president who embraces popular constitutionalism) may well be at odds with what Kramer seeks to 
accomplish in his book. As best I can tell, Kramer intends for Congress to dominate popular constitu-
tionalism. For example, even though he speaks sweepingly of "constitutional understandings deter-
mined in politics" and "the thinking of ordinary citizens and politicians," he ultimately equates 
extrajudicial debates with Congress. KRAMER, supra note 3, at 235-41 . 
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sisted, presumably through legislation that either repudiates court decision-
making or remands wrongly decided cases back to the courts.5 
DeLay's comments, however, also highlight some of the practical 
problems associated with implementing Kramer's popular constitutional-
ism. First, Congress and the American people care about outcomes, not 
constitutional interpretation. Increasing partisanship within Congress, 
moreover, has resulted in a regime in which lawmakers care less and less 
about constitutional questions. The focus, instead, is the crafting of a mes-
sage that resonates with their party's political base. Second, and relatedly, 
an increasingly partisan Congress is not likely to speak the people's voice. 
The median voter is not well served by a system that validates interest 
group politics, the push for reelection, and the expectation that lawmakers 
will agree with their party's message. Indeed, the Supreme Court is far 
more likely than Congress to take into account majoritarian preferences. 
Third, even if Congress sought to put into place the people's will, it is very 
difficult to measure what people think. This is especially true on questions 
of constitutional interpretation (which are of little interest to the people). 
In the pages that follow, I will support these claims. In part, I will talk 
about the Schiavo legislation. But I will make broader points about the 
lawmaking process and, with it, Congress's interest in constitutional inter-
pretation. 
I. DOES CONGRESS OR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CARE ABOUT 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION? 
Today's lawmakers and the American people have little or no interest 
in constitutional interpretation. Notwithstanding the Senate's prodding of 
Supreme Court nominees Samuel Alito and John Roberts on precedent, 
unenumerated rights, the unitary executive, and the balance of powers be-
tween the federal and state governments, lawmakers and their constituents 
do not care about constitutional interpretation. The Court, for example, 
played no role in the 2004 presidential election. John Kerry and George W. 
Bush largely ignored the Court. Voters likewise considered the Court a 
nonissue. Opinion polls revealed that less than 1 percent of voters either 
5. Kramer does not speak about lawmakers remanding a case they think was wrongly decided 
back to the courts. For reasons detailed infra, I think that Kramer's brand of popular constitutionalism 
should extend to such cases. See infra note 45. Moreover, as Kramer recognizes, popular constitutional-
ism is about " the Justices' attitudes and self-conception," not about the "day-to-day business of decid-
ing cases. There would still be briefs and oral argument and precedents and opinions." KRAMER, supra 
note 3, at 253. Consequently, it should not matter how lawmakers express their disapproval of judicial 
action--either way the courts will eventually rule on Congress's efforts to repudiate an earlier judicial 
ruling. 
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considered the Supreme Court the most important factor in their vote or 
thought that the Court should be President Bush's top priority in his second 
term. 6 Therefore, it should come as no surprise that what matters to both 
voters and elected officials is outcomes; the theories of interpretation that 
back up outcomes are largely irrelevant. 
Consider, for example, federalism. The Rehnquist Court's federalism 
revival was largely ignored by Congress and the American people. Law-
makers did not hold hearings about these decisions and there was almost no 
mention of the precedential impact of these rulings in the Congressional 
Record. 7 The reason: lawmakers largely agreed with the outcomes the 
Court reached and, as such, ignored the fact that the Court was chipping 
away at congressional power. 8 
For their part, the American people were almost certainly unaware of 
Rehnquist Court federalism rulings.9 Supreme Court decisions rarely regis-
ter with the American people. Opinion poll data, for example, reveal that 
no more than 40 percent of Americans pay any attention to the Court.IO In 
fact, only about 40 percent of Americans know that the Supreme Court 
permitted first-trimester abortions in Roe v. Wade) I And when it comes to 
identifying the Chief Justice of the United States, a 1989 poll revealed that 
"only 9 percent could name William Rehnquist as the chief justice, while 
54 percent correctly named Judge Wapner as the judge on the television 
6. Press Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Moral Values: How Important? 
Voters Liked Campaign 2004, but Too Much 'Mud-Slinging' 15 (Nov. II , 2004), http://people-
press.org/reports/pdf/233.pdf; Press Release, Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll (Nov. 18, 2004), 
http://origin.foxnews.com/projects/pdf!lii804_poll.pdf. See also TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN 
DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 165-67 (1999) (citing numerous studies on public ' s ignorance of the 
Supreme Court and its decisions); William G. Ross, Op-Ed, Why the Supreme Court Is Not an Election 
Issue, and Why It Should Become One, JuRIST, Oct. 21 , 2004, available at 
http :1 /jurist.la w. pitt. edu/forumy /2004/ I 0/why -supreme-court -is-not -election. php. Considering that 
Chief Justice Rehnquist underwent a tracheotomy one week before the 2004 elections, these numbers 
are especially striking. For additional discussion, see infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text. 
7. See Neal Devins, Commentary, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court 's 
Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001) (detailing lawmakers' failure to discuss these rulings 
in Congressional Record); Keith E. Whittington, Hearing About the Constitution in Congressional 
Committees, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 87 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 
2005) (noting that Congress did not hold a significant number of hearings on federalism in response to 
the Rehnquist Court' s federalism revival). 
8. See Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123 (2003) 
(arguing that Congress agreed with the outcomes in 1990s Supreme Court cases revitalizing federal-
ism). 
9. There is no opinion poll data on these decisions, apparently because pollsters did not think 
these decisions were of interest to the American people. 
10. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 
126 (1991) (coJlecting studies on public knowledge of the Court); David Adamany & Joel B. Grossman, 
Support for the Supreme Court as a National Policymaker, 5 LAW & POL'Y. Q. 405, 407 (1983) (same). 
II. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 145 ( 1989). 
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show The People's Court."12 Summarizing this data, political scientist 
Robert Carp observed that the "[C]ourt is an amorphous blob to most 
Americans." 13 
More significant, even if the American people and their agents were 
well informed, there is good reason to think that lawmakers, interest 
groups, and the American people have little incentive to check Supreme 
Court federalism decision-making. Unless judicial interpretations foreclose 
the pursuit of first-order policy priorities, it is unlikely that any constitu-
ency will push for a broad (or narrow) theory of federalism.14 Women's 
interests, for example, sometimes back expansive national powers (e.g., the 
Violence Against Women Act), and at other times oppose a broad vision of 
federal power (e.g., federal partial-birth abortion legislation). Pro-life inter-
ests likewise pay attention to their substantive policy agenda when deciding 
whether to back or oppose expansive federal powers. 
And while lawmakers and the American people may have a stronger 
sense of stake in constitutional questions involving race, religion, speech, 
and other rights, 15 the real concern of voters, interest groups, and political 
parties is and always will be first-order policy priorities.16 Indeed, changes 
in congressional practice over the past two decades suggest that today's 
12. PERETTI, supra note 6, at 167 (citing a 1989 Washington Post poll). 
13. Richard L. Berke, A Missing Issue in the Big Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1996, § 4, at I. This 
phenomenon is explained, in part, by the fact that Court decisions generally conform to majoritarian 
preferences. See infra. As survey data of African-Americans and Southern whites during the Warren era 
reveals, individuals upset with Court rulings are far more likely to know about the Court than other 
Americans. See Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 
Nw. U. L. REv. 985, 999-1004 (1990). 
14. Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 131 (2004). For this 
very reason, Congress generally acquiesces to Court rulings that allow lawmakers to pursue their fa-
vored policy agenda in some other way. See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION 
IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM (2004) (noting that Congress 
is interested in finding some democratic outlet to pursue its favored vision of the Constitution, not in 
contradicting Court interpretations of the Constitution). 
15. Perhaps for this reason, Mark Tushnet draws a distinction between the thin Constitution 
(structure) and thick Constitution (rights) in his proposal to "take the Constitution away from the 
courts." MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). See also Neal 
Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining Why Senate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist 
Court Decision Making but Not the Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1307 (2002). 
16. Judge Richard Posner put it this way: 
Even if there were [a federal town meeting at which 200 million Americans could deliberate 
and then take a vote], it would be unrealistic to suppose that their vote would be based on 
their ideas about constitutional law. It would be based on their visceral approval or disap-
proval of the judicial decision that had been appealed to them .. . . 
Richard A. Posner, The People 's Court, NEW REPUBLIC, July 19, 2004, at 32, 35. Correspondingly, 
while opinion polls have been taken about American attitudes towards gun regulation, opinion polls 
have not been taken on the Supreme Court' s decision in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
(striking down a provision of the Brady Act on Tenth Amendment grounds). More generally, opinion 
polls have not been taken of Rehnquist Court rulings limiting congressional power on federalism 
grounds. See Devins, supra note 15, at 1320. 
2006] TOM DELAY: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALIST? 1059 
Congress is less interested in constitutional interpretation than earlier Con-
gresses. 
Party polarization is "one of the most obvious and recognizable 
trends" in the modem Congress.l7 Republicans, without exception, are to 
the right of Democrats. Moreover, the increasing ideological divide now 
separating Republicans and Democrats will likely grow.l8 In part, with 
only one-half of eligible voters actually voting, each party places greater 
emphasis on mobilizing its base. Correspondingly, with computer-driven 
redistricting guaranteeing certain seats to Republicans and others to De-
mocrats in the House of Representatives,l9 candidates increasingly look to 
the partisans who vote in party primaries. 
The consequences of this political polarization are profound. Cohesion 
within the parties, structural changes in Congress that shift power to party 
leaders, and the growing power of partisans in congressional elections have 
all contributed to the growth of "message politics"-that is, the use of the 
legislative process to make a symbolic statement to voters and other con-
stituents.20 This shift to message politics has also contributed to declining 
lawmaker interest in Congress's power to independently interpret the Con-
stitution.21 Consider, for example, congressional committee consideration 
of constitutional questions. Over the past thirty years, the percentage of 
hearings raising significant constitutional issues has declined throughout 
Congress.22 One explanation for this phenomenon is the growing ideologi-
17. Sean M. Theriault, The Case of the Vanishing Moderates: Party Polarization in the Modem 
Congress 5 (May 2, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
www.la.utexas.edu/-seant/vanishing.pdf. 
18. For a detailing of why this is so (including support for the assertions that I make in the balance 
of this paragraph), see Samuel lssacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American 
Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415 (2004). 
19. The November 2006 elections will test the proposition that nearly all House seats-thanks to 
computer-driven redistricting-are "safe" seats for either Democrats or Republicans. Popular disap-
proval of President George W. Bush may spill over to the 2006 elections and, consequently, there is 
some reason to think that "safe" Republican seats will be contested-so much so that Democrats hope 
to retake control of the House in 2006. For a news analysis linking computer-driven redistricting to 
Democratic efforts to regain control of the House, see Paul West, Democrats Have Shot to Gain House 
or Senate: Bush 's Slump, Voter Ire Shaping the Outlook of Fall Elections, BAL T. SUN, May 7, 2006, at 
3A. 
20. See generally C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in CONGRESS 
RECONSIDERED 217 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001 ). 
21. The balance of this paragraph and much of the next two paragraphs are taken from Neal 
Devins, Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2006). 
22. Keith E. Whittington et al., The Constitution and Congressional Committees: 1971-2000, in 
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE (Tsvi Kahana & Richard Bauman, eds., 
forthcoming 2006). Of those committees that regularly considered constitutional questions (education, 
labor, foreign affairs, judiciary), the only ones that continue to hold the same number of constitutional 
hearings are the Judiciary Committees. See id. 
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cal polarization in Congress.23 As compared to the Warren and Burger 
Court eras (where regional divides and ideological diversity cut back the 
power of party leaders), today's lawmakers are committed to their party's 
policy agenda. The question of whether the Supreme Court will find that 
agenda constitutional matters less to today' s lawmakers. 24 
When today's Congress considers constitutional questions, moreover, 
lawmakers steer clear of nonpartisan witnesses, preferring instead to hear 
from witnesses that will back up the preexisting views of the party that 
selects that witness.25 An increasingly ideological, increasingly polarized 
Congress sees hearings as staged events in which each side can call wit-
nesses who will explain their views to the public.26 In sharp contrast, com-
mittee hearings during the Warren and Burger Court eras reflected 
ideological diversity within the Democratic and Republican parties.27 Most 
notably, several Senate committees made use of unified staffs and generally 
operated in a bipartisan way, so that hearings considering constitutional 
questions often featured nonpartisan academic experts. 28 
Another measure of how today' s Congress differs from the earlier 
Congresses is lawmaker attitudes towards congressional interpretation of 
the Constitution. In 1959 (when lawmakers cared intensely about Warren 
Court decisions on school desegregation and subversives), 40 percent of 
lawmakers thought that courts should give controlling weight to congres-
23. For a more detailed treatment, see id. 
24. For this and other reasons, the Supreme Court's federalism revival did not prompt a legislative 
backlash. As noted above, the federalism revival did not undermine the policy agenda of either progres-
sive or conservative interests. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. Consequently, even though 
Rehnquist Court federalism decisions curtailed Congress's power, today's lawmakers saw no reason to 
take a hard look at decisions that had little to do with the "message" they were seeking to craft. Indeed, 
the federalism-related hearings that Congress did hold in the 1990s did not focus on the Court; instead, 
they were mainly concerned with the Contract with America and other federalism-related reforms 
associated with the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress. See Whittington, supra note 7, at 93-95. 
25. See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons from Bill 
Van Alstyne's Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525 (2005). 
26. See ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 214--15 (9th 
ed. 2004) (hearings "are often orchestrated as a form of political theatre"). Furthermore, because there 
is rarely an academic consensus on the constitutional questions that divide Democrats and Republicans, 
committee staffers can always find a sincere, well-qualified constitutional law expert willing to back 
their position. 
27. I do not mean to suggest here that constitutional values do not play a role in party politics. The 
Democratic and Republican parties, more than ever before, embrace an agenda that includes policy 
positions on race, privacy, and a host of constitutional issues. See H.W. Peny & L.A. Powe, Jr., The 
Political Battle for the Constitution, CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2006). For reasons detailed here 
and in other writings, however, I do not think that the Democratic or Republican parties have a vision 
about constitutional interpretation. Their concern, instead, is advancing a policy agenda on issues that 
resonate with their increasingly partisan base. See also Posner, supra note 16, at 35-36. 
28. See Devins, supra note 25, at 1543-44 (making this point by comparing congressional prac-
tices before and after 1985). 
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sional interpretations of the Constitution; in 2000 (during the height of the 
Rehnquist Court federalism revival), only 13.8 percent of lawmakers 
thought that the courts should give controlling weight to congressional 
interpretations of the Constitution.29 Correspondingly, 71 percent of to-
day's lawmakers adhere to a "joint constitutionalist" perspective whereby 
courts should give either "limited" or "no weight" to congressional assess-
ments of the constitutionality of legislation. 30 
Today's Congress, as detailed above, is both more accepting of Su-
preme Court control of constitutional decision-making and less engaged in 
constitutional questions than previous Congresses.31 Consequently, the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts had and have a freer hand to shape constitu-
tional decision-making than did the Warren and Burger Courts.32 Neverthe-
less, the Rehnquist Court regularly took social and political forces into 
account. 33 Rehnquist Court rulings on divisive social issues often turned on 
the votes of the Court's swing Justices-Sandra Day O'Connor and An-
29. Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary 
Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes, 1959-2001, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 127, 147 tbl.3 (2004). 
30. /d. 
31. Congressional acceptance of Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution is not contra-
dicted by recent lawmaker efforts to either strip or curtail federal court participation in same-sex mar-
riage, the Pledge of Allegiance, the Ten Commandments, and lawsuits filed by enemy combatants. As I 
have detailed elsewhere, these lawmaker challenges are largely rhetorical attacks rather than heartfelt 
attempts to shift power away from the courts. See Devins, supra note 21. 
32. As Powe observed in an outstanding review of The People Themselves, Kramer wrongly 
ignores the post-Brown efforts of lawmakers to shape constitutional decision-making. See L.A. Powe, 
Jr., Are "the People" Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855 (2005) (book 
review). At the same time, l think Powe overstates his case. Changes in Congress have resulted in 
increasing lawmaker acquiescence to the Supreme Court. And while (as Powe and H.W. Perry have 
argued) the Democratic and Republican parties embrace "messages" on a range of constitutional issues, 
their messages are about outcomes, not constitutional interpretation. See supra note 27. 
33. In general, the Supreme Court cannot help but take social and political forces into account. 
The process of appointing and confirming Supreme Court Justices ensures that the policy preferences of 
the Justices are consistent with the values of elected officials. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in 
a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 284-86 (1957). More 
than that, there is good reason to think that (some) Justices take into account the views of elected offi-
cials, elites, and the American people (as measured by popular opinion). Lou Fisher and I recently 
published a book that demonstrates the pervasive role that elected officials and the American people 
play in shaping constitutional values. See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS fiSHER, THE DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2004). Several other studies make this point, including MARSHALL, supra note 11, at 
192 (noting that "the modem Court has been an essentially majoritarian institution"), JEFFREY A. 
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 424 
(2002) ("Supreme Court decisions by and large correspond with public opinion."), and LEE EPSTEIN & 
JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 12- 13 (1998) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices "act 
strategically," realizing that their "success or failure depends on the preferences of other actors [includ-
ing elected officials]"). See also Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
425, 427, 447 (2005) (noting that adjudication is one of many means that politicians employ in order to 
"make their constitutional visions the law of the land" and, as such, "judicial review rarely pits the 
people against the courts. Political struggles over judicial power are between people who want courts to 
make certain policy decisions and people who prefer those decisions to be made by other institutions."). 
1062 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol81:1055 
thony Kennedy. These Justices did not have hard preferences on outcomes 
or reasoning. 34 As such, they embraced doctrinal formulas that allowed 
them to take into account elite opinion, elected government pressures, and 
the desires of the American people. Rehnquist Court decisions backing 
abortion rights, affirmative action, campaign finance, gay rights, school 
prayer restrictions, school vouchers, and much more are readily tied to 
majoritarian preferences.35 Even the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival 
can be traced to public and lawmaker support for devolving power away 
from Washington, D.C., and to the states.36 
Against the backdrop of increasing partisanship in Congress (partisan-
ship that will likely persist in this era of computer-drawn congressional 
districts), there is reason to think that the Supreme Court will steer a more 
centrist course than Congress or the White House. 37 The Supreme Court, in 
other words, better represents median voters than does the Congress, whose 
energy is focused on the interest groups and partisans who dominate party 
politics and party primaries. Relatedly, congressional disinterest in consti-
tutional questions is likely to continue, so the courts may prove a better 
vehicle than the legislature for the people to pursue popular constitutional-
ism. Time will tell, of course. After all, the Supreme Court's composition is 
in flux and it is impossible to predict the Court's willingness to listen to the 
American people, lawmakers, and the like. With that said, recent trends in 
Congress signal that today's lawmakers are less likely to engage in popular 
constitutionalism than the lawmakers of earlier Congresses. 
11. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ACTION?: LESSONS FROM THE 
TERRI SCHIAVO CASE 
When Congress enacted "An Act for the relief of the parents of 
Theresa Marie Schiavo,"38 lawmakers argued that they were engaged in a 
heroic struggle to protect the constitutional right to life of a brain-damaged 
young woman. Castigating the failure of state courts in Florida to appropri-
ately value the interest of Terri Schiavo (and all Americans) in life, Repub-
lican leadership affirmatively embraced the culture of life by arguing that 
34. For a general treatment of swing Justices in general and O' Connor in particular, see Dahlia 
Lithwick, A High Court of One: The Role of the "Swing Voter" in the 2002 Term, in A YEAR AT THE 
SUPREME COURT 11 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 2004). 
35. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 33; Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 63. 
36. See Devins, supr(,l note 35, at 79- 81. 
37. See discussion supra note 33; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Center Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 
12, 2005, § 6, at 17 (making this argument). 
38. Act ofMar. 21,2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
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Terri Schiavo should be given one final chance.39 In particular, rather than 
accept state court findings that Terri Schiavo (then in a persistent vegeta-
tive state) would rather die than be kept alive artificially, Congress asked 
the federal courts to sort out whether the removal of a feeding tube violated 
Ms. Schiavo's constitutional rights. 
Sponsors of the legislation (most notably Senate Majority Leader Bill 
Frist (R-Tenn.) and then-House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Tex.)) 
also signaled that the American people were behind their efforts. Frist, for 
example, spoke of the legislation as "affirm[ing] our nation's commitment 
to preserving the sanctity of life."40 DeLay noted that the "[American peo-
ple] care, and we care, about saving Terri Schiavo's life."41 Several other 
Republican lawmakers referenced the American people's approval of con-
gressional intervention. 42 
Congressional consideration of the Schiavo bill also addressed consti-
tutional questions. Supporters of the legislation spoke of Congress's re-
sponsibility in protecting the constitutional right to life; opponents invoked 
federalism and the separation of powers. For example, House Judiciary 
Committee chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.) spoke of Terri 
Schiavo's "right to life" and the larger fight for the "culture of life," saying 
that the "battle to defend the preciousness of every life in a culture that 
respects and defends life is not only Terri's fight, but it is America's 
fight. "43 In contrast, several House Democrats resisted the legislation by 
invoking constitutional norms. For Robert Wexler (D-Fla.), "the [Republi-
can] majority wishes to undermine over 200 years of jurisprudence and a 
long history in this country for respect for our judicial independence as 
well as the States court systems and the jurisdictions assigned to it."44 
39. See Shailagh Murray & Mike Allen, Schiavo Case Tests Priorities of GOP, WASH. POST, Mar. 
26, 2005, at AI. 
40. Press Release, Frist Comments on Schiavo Bill Enrollment (Mar. 21, 2005), 
http://frist.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=l886. 
41. DeLay, supra note 2. 
42. See, e.g., !51 CONG. REc. Hl720 (2005) (statement of Rep. Blunt (R-Mo.)) ("[M]ost Ameri-
cans see a difference" between "giving someone food and water and putting someone on incredible life 
support systems."); id. at H1722 (statement of Rep. Kennedy (R-Minn.)) ("Americans believe in a 
culture of life, not a culture that teiis the weak and vulnerable there is no place for them at the table."). 
43. !d. at Hl70l (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). 
44. !d. at Hl703. Likewise, Barney Frank (D-Mass.) and Jim Davis (D-Fla.) spoke about the 
separation of powers. Frank lamented, "Congress deals with broad policy. Individual adjudications are 
made by judges . . .. None of that has happened here .... Ideology is driving this, and that is why we 
have a separation of powers." !d. at Hl708. Davis reiterated many of these arguments and said, "This 
Congress is about to overturn the separation of powers by disregarding the laws of Florida and the 
decision of a judge that have never been reversed. This Congress is on the verge of telling States and 
judges and juries that their laws, their decisions do not matter." !d. at Hl71 0. See also Keith Perine, 
Congress and the Rule of Law, 63 CQ WKL Y. 782 (2005). 
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Against this backdrop, it appears that the Schiavo case is an example 
of popular constitutionalism. Lawmakers invoked the will of the American 
people in sorting out the meaning of constitutional rights. Moreover, rather 
than embrace judicial supremacy, lawmakers were willing to second-guess 
the judgment and values of the Florida courts that ordered the removal of 
Terri Schiavo's feeding tube.45 
Upon closer examination, however, Congress's intervention in the 
Schiavo case appears to be little more than special interest politics. Over 
the past few years, Republicans in Congress have partnered with religious 
conservatives in pursuing a raft of court-curbing measures, including pro-
posals to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction in cases involving the Ten 
Commandments and same-sex marriage.46 The Schiavo legislation exem-
plifies GOP efforts to solidify support among social conservatives. The 
original bill was drafted by the National Right to Life Committee. More 
significantly, by embracing the culture of life in the Schiavo case, Republi-
can leaders sought to strengthen their ties with Christian conservatives. 
Knowing the critical role that Christian conservatives play both in ever-
important party primaries47 and in party efforts to bring out the vote in 
general elections, congressional Republicans think it important to deliver a 
message that resonates with religious conservatives. For this very reason, 
Republicans have long sought to build ties with right-to-life interests (in-
terests that strongly backed the Schiavo legislation).48 
45. I understand, of course, that Congress asked the federal courts to assume jurisdiction in the 
case-so that the legislation did not seek to overturn the state courts but, instead, facilitated the possible 
federal court overruling of state court decision-making. Nevertheless, lawmakers certainly signaled 
their disapproval of judicial findings based on an ostensibly independent interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. For additional discussion, see supra note 5. 
46. See generally Devins, supra note 21 ; Sam Rosenfeld, Disorder in the Court, AM. PROSPECT, 
July 2005, at 24. 
47. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (noting dominant role that party primaries now 
play in electoral races for the House of Representatives). 
48. President George W. Bush's support for the Terri Schiavo legislation follows a similar script. 
President Bush looked to party partisans when running for reelection in 2004. David S. Broder, An Old-
Fashioned Win, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at A25. In particular, Bush targeted religious conserva-
tives-a strategy that proved successful in an election year that emphasized moral values. See Laurie 
Goodstein & William Yardley, President Benefits from Efforts to Build a Coalition of Religious Voters, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at A22; Dana Milbank, For the President, a Vote of Full Faith and Credit: 
Evangelical Christians Shed Their Reluctance to Mix Religion and Politics on Election Day, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 7, 2004, at A 7. When it came time to sign the Schiavo bill (a bill his administration 
backed), the President cut short a trip to Texas and flew back to Washington, D.C. Anne E. Kornblut, 
After Signing Schiavo Law, Bush Says 'It Is Wisest to Always Err on the Side of Lifo, ' N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
22, 2005, at Al9. His signing statement embraced the culture of life, noting that "I will continue to 
stand on the side of those defending life for all Americans .. . . " Statement on Signing Legislation for 
the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 484 (Mar. 21, 
2005). 
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In addition to longstanding Republican efforts to be the "party of life," 
Republican leaders Tom DeLay and Bill Frist were especially interested in 
using the Schiavo legislation as a way of strengthening their ties with 
Christian conservatives. Frist sought to shore up support from right-to-life 
interests as part of his planned run for the presidency in 2008.49 DeLay, 
who was then the subject of ethics investigations, sought to protect his job 
as House Majority Leader by rallying social conservatives behind him. so 
Democratic opposition to the bill emphasized the apparent politiciza-
tion and interest group manipulation of Terri Schiavo's plight. Two of the 
loudest voices of opposition during the House floor debate were Barney 
Frank (D-Mass.) and Jim Moran (D-Va.).5I On the floor, supporting the 
politicization argument, Frank said, "Does anyone think that this decision 
will be made without consideration of electoral support or party of ideol-
ogy? Of course not."52 Moran was more specific about the religious inter-
ests driving the Schiavo legislation, contending that the "reason this issue is 
before us, I think, is that it is all about religion and politics."53 
For the most part, however, Democrats stood aside, voting with the 
Republicans while saying very little. Fearing that social conservatives 
would rally against them if they opposed the bill, Democrats thought it best 
to leave it to the federal courts to determine Ms. Schiavo's fate.54 In other 
words, the Schiavo bill seems to be a classic case of Congress validating 
the views of a potent minority with intense preferences. The question re-
mains: is this an example of "the 'exploitation' of the great by the small"?55 
In particular, what of congressional claims that the American people 
49. See David D. Kirkpatrick & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, How Family 's Cause Reached the Halls of 
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at Al; The Doctor's New Right Wing, ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.), 
Apr. 30, 2005, at 32. For similar reasons, Frist attended and spoke at a nationally televised rally spon-
sored by the Family Research Council, where one of its leaders depicted Democratic opposition to 
George W. Bush judicial nominees as "tyranny to people of faith." CNN.com, Frist Speaks to Christian 
Anti-Filibuster Rally, Apr. 25, 2005, http://edition.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/04/24/justice.sunday/. 
50. In a speech before the Family Research Council, DeLay linked the negative response to the 
Schiavo legislation from media elites to coordinated attacks on American conservatism and his own 
ethics battles. For DeLay, "[T]hat whole syndicate that they have going on right now .. . is for one 
purpose and one purpose only, and that is to destroy the conservative movement." Carl Hulse & Adam 
Nagoumey, Briefly Back in the Spotlight, DeLay Now Steps Aside, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at A9. 
51. See Richard E. Cohen, Congressional Chronicle: Divine Intervention?, 37 NAT'L J. 921 (2005). 
52. 151 CONG. REc. H 1708 (2005). 
53. !d. at H1712. Moran also rebuked Congress by saying, "But does not every religion teach, first 
of all, that no human being has the right to play God? And is not one of the very first principles of 
politics is that we should not use individual human tragedies .. . to appease the interest groups that keep 
us in power." Id. 
54. Joyce Purnick, Passing Buck on Schiavo Cheats Public, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at B 1. 
55. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 35 (1971) (emphasis omitted). 
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backed the Schiavo legislation? After all, Republican sponsors of the bill 
might have thought that they were advancing a bill that was backed by 
most Americans, not just Christian conservatives. 
No way. The American people made clear their opposition to the 
Schiavo intervention in opinion polls taken both before and after Con-
gress's approval of the bill. In 2003 (nearly two years before Congress 
acted), a Fox News poll showed that 61 percent of people asked would 
have removed Ms. Schiavo's feeding tube at that time.56 On March 18, 
2005 (days before the final bill was passed), a CNN/USA Today poll re-
vealed that 56 percent of those polled felt the feeding tube should be re-
moved. 57 
When enacting the Schiavo bill, lawmakers placed the intense prefer-
ences of social conservatives ahead of the presumably weak preferences of 
most Americans. What lawmakers did not anticipate was widespread voter 
disapproval of Congress's intervention into the case. Not only did most 
Americans support the removal of Ms. Schiavo's feeding tube, many indi-
viduals who disagreed with the Florida court order nevertheless thought 
that Congress's intervention was inappropriate. One opinion poll showed 
that 82 percent of Americans thought that the federal government should 
have stayed out of the Schiavo matter; and while other polls were less 
damning of Congress, all polls revealed widespread dissatisfaction with the 
federal government's intervention in the case. 58 
Perhaps for this reason, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, President 
George W. Bush, and most Republicans backed ''judicial independence" 
after the federal courts refused to challenge state court fact-finding in the 
Terri Schiavo case.59 And while a handful of lawmakers (most notably 
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay and Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex.)) 
vilified the federal courts as "arrogant, out-of-control, [and] unaccount-
56. Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll, Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion, Question ID No. 
USODFOX. 103103, R38, Oct. 28-29, 2003. 
57. Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion, Question ID No. 
USGALLUP.05MARI8, R22, Mar. 18-20,2005. 
58. See CBS News Poll, Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion, Question ID No. USCBS.032305, Rl7, 
Mar. 21, 2005; ABC News Poll, Roper Ctr. for Pub Opinion, Question ID No. USABC.032105, R06, 
Mar. 20, 2005; Harris Poll, Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion, Question ID No. USHARRIS.041505, R2G, 
Apr. 5, 2005. 
59. Frist said that he believed that the courts were "fair and independent," Jill Zuckman, Democ-
rats Accuse GOP of Trying to Undermine Judiciary, CHI. TRIB. , Apr. 6, 2005, § 1, at 16, and that "the 
balance of power among all three branches requires respect-not retaliation." Senator Bill Frist, Frist 
Statement for Family Research Council Telecast (Apr. 24, 2005), 
http:/ /frist.senate.gov /index .cfm? F useAction=S peeches. Detail&Speech_id= 189. 
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able,"60 lawmakers thought it better to defer to popular sentiment than in-
terest group pressure and partisan positioning. 
Congress's eventual backing of popular sentiment is anything but a 
rallying call for popular constitutionalism. Throughout the Schiavo affair, 
Congress signaled its disinterest in constitutional interpretation and the 
desires of the American people. Interest group politics trumped opinion 
polls before the legislation was enacted. Likewise, Congress was far more 
interested in pursuing a desired political outcome than in sorting out the 
underlying constitutional issues in the dispute over the removal of Ms. 
Schiavo's feeding tubes. Congress only relented after being confronted 
with surprising, overwhelming evidence of widespread disapproval of its 
intervention. Throughout the Schiavo litigation, moreover, the courts (state 
and federal) seemed far more in tune with popular sentiment than did law-
makers in Florida and Congress.6t Put another way: if this is popular con-
stitutionalism, Kramer might want to rethink his rebuke of judicial 
supremacy. 
CONCLUSION: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
Larry Kramer's popular constitutionalism is both poorly timed and 
unworkable. Increasing partisan divides among lawmakers make today's 
Congress an ill-suited conveyor of the people's thinking on constitutional 
issues. Indeed, there is strong evidence suggesting that the Supreme Court 
may be a more accurate bellwether of the median voter than Congress. And 
even if lawmakers were willing to validate the desires of the American 
people, those desires are about outcomes, not constitutional interpretation. 
Further complicating Congress's pursuit of popular constitutionalism, it is 
often difficult to ascertain the thinking of the American people. For exam-
ple, public attitudes shift; also, interest groups and other suppliers of infor-
mation to Congress may spin the data in ways that make it hard to measure 
public sentiment. 
60. Mike Allen, GOP Seeks More Curbs on Courts: Sensenbrenner Proposes an Inspector Gen-
eral, WASH. POST, May 12, 2005, at A3; Editorial, Beyond the Pale, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2005, at B6. 
61. In 2003, the Florida legislature passed a law allowing Governor Bush to order Ms. Schiavo's 
feeding tube reinserted. Adam Liptak, In Florida Right-to-Die Case, Legislation That Puts the Constitu-
tion at Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A20. That law was eventually struck down by the Florida 
Supreme Court. Abby Goodnough, Feed-Tube Law Is Struck Down in Florida Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
24, 2004, at A I. A broader bill was considered more than once but was ultimately defeated in the 
Florida Senate. John Kennedy, State Senate Rejects Bill to Reinsert Feeding Tube, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Mar. 24, 2005, at A 12. Governor Bush was active throughout the controversy. Adam Nagourney, In a 
Polarizing Case, Jeb Bush Cements His Political Stature, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2005, at A I . Polls 
suggested that Florida voters disapproved of political action taken in the case. Jerome R. Stockfisch, 
Politicians' Handling of Schiavo Case Earns Disapproval, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 14, 2005, Nation/World, 
at 14. 
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The problems of popular constitutionalism are illustrated by Con-
gress's intervention in the Terri Schiavo case. While legislative sponsors of 
the bill invoked the rhetoric of popular constitutionalism, the Terri Schiavo 
Incapacitated Protection Bill seems little more than special interest politics. 
Polling data suggesting public disapproval of the bill were initially pushed 
aside; intensity of position mattered more than numbers and congressional 
tradition. Religious conservatives determined both Democratic and Repub-
lican action: Republicans did not want to face a more conservative primary 
opponent armed with the support of the social conservative base, and De-
mocrats did not want to face a challenger who could point at them and say, 
"You voted to kill Terri Schiavo."62 
In highlighting the problems of putting popular constitutionalism into 
action, I do not mean to embrace judicial supremacy. Lawmakers and the 
American people, as Kramer argues, are ill-served by a system that gives 
the Court the final word on the Constitution's meaning. Indeed, as Lou 
Fisher and I have argued elsewhere, elected officials and the American 
people must challenge the Court.63 More than that, the Court must listen to 
Congress and the American people (among others). Otherwise, the Court 
will become isolated and the Constitution less enduring.64 At the same 
time, the Court needs to speak its voice.65 That way all parts of government 
participate in shaping the Constitution's meaning. That way we can have a 
democratic constitution that endures and provides stability to all parts of 
government and the people as well. 
62. William Schneider, Political Pulse: The Public to Politicians: 'Keep Out, ' 37 NAT' L J. 1008, 
(2005); see also Charlie Cook, The Cook Report: Deja Vu, as the GOP Panders and Democrats Lack 
Spines, 37 NAT' L J. 932 (2005). 
63. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 33; Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and 
Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83 (1998). 
64. Lou Fisher and I make this point in Devins & Fisher, supra note 63, at 85. 
65. For a critique of The People Themselves that highlights the important contribution that courts 
can make in engaging in constitutional dialogues with elected officials, see Lawrence G. Sager, Court-
ing Disaster, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1361 (2005). I also make this point in Neal Devins, The Democ-
racy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971 , 1990-91 (1999) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999)). 
